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Ignorance of law no excuse for acquittal
2007-05-14 08:45:34
By Keregero Keregero
Ignorance of law is one of the statutory rules of criminal responsibility as clearly manifested in Chapter 1V of the Penal Code, Cap.16 Vol.1 of the Revised Laws of Tanzania.
Like general principles of Criminal Law the rules operate as defence of a general nature and may be raised in appropriate situations in criminal trials.
Whether an individual can plead ignorance of law as a defence for an offence committed and successfully make it in a competent Court of law is a fundamental question to address.
In our discussion, we invoke the inputs of Section 8 of the Penal Code, Cap.16 Vol.1 of the Revised Laws of Tanzania.
It provides:`Ignorance of the law does not afford any excuse for any act or omission which would otherwise constitute an offence unless knowledge of the law by the offender is expressly declared to be an element of the offence.`
In simple terms, an individual`s ignorance of the law cannot simply be a defence in the eyes of the law for an offence committed.
But ignorance of fact, unlike the former, can be a good excuse.
This rule is presumably based on the presumption, ill founded though, that everybody knows the law.
However, in the absence of this rule it would be difficult if not impossible, to convict any person of any offence as the same person could simply plead ignorance of law as a defence and the court would then proceed to acquit the individual.
The best justification for this strict rule is expediency. For it would otherwise be very difficult to prove that an accused person in every case knew the law he violated.
The qualification to the rule that `unless knowledge of the law by the offender is expressly declared to be an element of the offence` is unimportant as there is no offence in the code or else where which states knowledge of the law as an element of the offence.
In an old English case of R.V Bailey 1800 R.& R.1 a sailor was convicted of contravening an Act of Parliament which he could not possibly have known since it was enacted when he was away at sea, and the offence was committed before the news of its commitment could reach him.
This rule has some semblance with the strict liability rule in the sense that mensrea is not considered in determining the guilt of an individual.
In Musa and Others V.R. (1970) E.A.42(C.A), a Member of Parliament gave a public speech in his constituency, in which he allegedly told the audience that the remedy for cattle theft which was common in the area was to raise an alarm whenever such a theft occurred, track down the thieves and kill them and that in the event people killed in a group they were acquitted in court, or no action was taken against them by the government.
The brief material facts of this case point to the fact that as a result of this speech, an alarm-group which was formed after the next cattle theft, searched out and killed various individuals thought to be the thieves.
Fourteen of the accused people were convicted of murder.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for East Africa, it was argued on behalf of those convicted that the killing was a result of the effect of the Member of Parliament`s speech which created such intention in the minds of the appellants, who were entitled to kill cattle thieves, because in effect the government had sanctioned it.
However, the Court of Appeal did not take on board this argument and rejected it altogether, holding as it did that the state of things referred to must be a factual state and that a speech by a Member of Parliament asserting incorrectly that the law had been changed so that people could now kill cattle thieves would not result in a mistake of fact but in a mistake of law which was no excuse for a crime.
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